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| 对全球化形势下亚洲地区国际关系驱动力的思考
（提纲）
广州暨南大学华侨华人研究所 高伟浓 |
| Reflections
on the Driving Forces Behind the International Relationship
in the Asian Region against the Background of Globalization
Gao
Wei Nong
Institute of Chinese and Overseas Chinese Research, JINAN
University, Guangzhou
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| In
modern international relations, to seek and to strengthen
bilateral or multilateral forms and modes of international
relations have become the primary foreign activities for the
politicians and diplomats of different countries. They also
constitute the topics of heated discussion among the academic
community. The purposes of this bilateral or multilateral
relation can be described as: 1. to initiate and develop equal,
reciprocal economic and trade co-operations and investments
among the countries and the regions involved; 2. to pursue
and reinforce mutual communications and to exchange ideas
concerning issues of common interest; 3. to coordinate the
stances between them and the outside world. Consequently,
to seek and to strengthen bilateral or multilateral forms
and modes of international relations is to discover the most
important driving force (henceforth referred to as "lever"
in this thesis) behind the development of modern international
relations. The present thesis intends to propose some tentative
ideas regarding the driving forces behind the international
relationship in the Asian region and how to detect and utilize
those driving forces. |
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| 在当今国际关系中，寻求和加强双边或多边国际联系的方式和形式已成为各国政治家、外交家的主要对外活动内容，也是学术界的热门话题。这些双边的或多边的联系的目的有：其一，开创和发展它们之间平等的、互利的经贸合作与投资；其二，寻求和加强相互沟通，就共同感兴趣的问题交换意见；其三，协调它们之间与外部世界的立场，等等。因此，寻找双边或多边联系的方式和形式，就是寻找当今国际关系发展的最重要驱动力（在本文中称之为"杠杆"）。本文拟就当今亚洲地区的国际关系驱动力及我们如何寻找和利用这些驱动力的问题提出一点不成熟的想法，供批评指正。 |
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| Part
I
Let
us begin with a discussion of the "split Asia".
There is only one Asia in the world, but that only refers
to the Asia in the geographical sense. In actuality, there
are several superimposed Asias --- different versions of
Asia as perceived from different perspectives. For instance,
there is an Asia "that is developing rapidly scientifically
and technologically", an Asia "that is not standardized
in its economic operation and thus is susceptible to crises",
an Asia "where nationalisms are running high",
an Asia "where rascal countries concentrate",
an Asia "where terrorism runs rampant", an Asia
"where different civilizations conflict against each
other", etc. This is somewhat analogous to the situation
in the story of the Blind Men and the Elephant: each blind
man can feel one part of the elephant and everyone believes
that the part he feels represents the whole of the elephant
and its characteristics. In analyzing problems, people tend
to focus on the individual parts. Methodologically, this
practice is undoubtedly necessary and correct. But if the
analysts merely stop at this point, they will possibly repeat
the mistakes committed by the blind men. Wise people should
not act the way the blind people act. They would come to
the conclusion of the elephant's overall characteristics
only after having achieved a complete picture of the elephant.
As a matter of fact, the above-mentioned case reflects the
multi-perspective commonly employed in the contemporary
analysis of international relations. People have increasingly
tended to approach modern international relations from much
broader viewpoints than before. Nevertheless, they might
also neglect the results of "focusing". Here,
the so-called "focusing" refers to the act of
commanding the "main chain" or the "main
lever" among the multi-contradictions in understanding
international relations (regional or global). |
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一
先从分裂的亚洲谈起。世界上只有一个亚洲，但这只是地理上的亚洲。其实世界上有数个"叠合"的亚洲--从不同的视角可以看到不同的亚洲。例如，一个"经济科技迅速发展"的亚洲；一个"经济运行不规范易受冲击的脆弱"的亚洲；一个"民族主义兴盛"的亚洲；一个"流氓国家集中"的亚洲"；一个"恐怖主义肆虐"的亚洲"；一个"不同文明激烈冲突中"的亚洲；等等。这有点象古老的"瞎人摸象"故事：每个瞎子都可以摸到象的某个部分，都以为这就是象的全部及其特征。人们在分析问题时，往往着眼于某个局部。从方法论来说，这无疑是正确的和必要的。但如果仅仅如此，或止于此，则分析者难免会重蹈"瞎子"的覆辙。智慧的人们不应是"瞎子"。他们会全方位地摸完整头"象"后才会判断出它的全部特征。其实，上述情况反映了现今普遍使用的分析国际关系时方法上的多角度化，人们越来越习惯于从比过去广泛得多的视域去理解当今的国际关系，但同时也可能会产生忽视"聚焦"的结果。这里所谓"聚焦"，也就是把握理解国际关系（地区的或国际的）多对矛盾的"主串链"或"主杠杆"。
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| Indeed,
Asia has never been "unified" either in the past
or in the present. The times when Asia is most unified are
the times when the main lever that drives the development
of Asia plays its most prominent role. Leaving aside the ancient
and modern periods when Asia was relatively isolated and self-enclosed,
we can say that 1950's was the time when Asia was most close
to "unification" in modern and contemporary age.
At that time, in the wake of the Second World War, former
Asian colonies and semi-colonies achieved independence one
after another. So many people were rejoicing over the birth
of a new Asia. The New Forces developed a high consensus over
the common notion of fighting against imperialism and colonialism.
This consensus prevailed over the differences in the political
system, economic development and cultural background of individual
countries that existed at that time. The Bandung Conference
was a typical indication of this pattern (Of course, China's
ingenious diplomacy contributed significantly to the formation
of this patter.). |
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| 确实，亚洲从来就没有"统一"过，过去没有，现在更谈不上有。亚洲最"统一"的时候，也就是驱动亚洲发展的主"杠杆"作用发挥得最显著的时候。撇开古代、近代相互封闭隔膜、虽近在咫尺，但事实上远隔参商的亚洲不说，近现代的亚洲最接近"统一"的时候，是在上世纪的五十年代。那时，二战刚结束，亚洲的前殖民地、半殖民地纷纷获得独立，多少人在欢呼新亚洲的诞生。"新兴力量"在反帝反殖的共同理念上形成了高度的一致，这种一致压倒了同时存在的政治制度上的、经济差异上的、文化背景上的分歧。万隆会义是这种格局的典型表现（当然，中国的巧妙外交有力促成了这种格局）。
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| But
this golden period was short-lived. The East-West confrontation
during the Cold War Period brought a quick end to the fragile
dominance of the New Forces' "lever" of anti-imperialism
and anti-colonialism. The neocolonialist "non-Asian"
forces penetrated into Asia and established anti-communist
alliance with some Asian countries, splitting Asia not only
in terms of geographical politics but also seriously undermining
the main "lever" that could unify Asia. From that
time on, politicians in Asian countries have been working
hard to discover a "lever" that could unify Asia
or part of Asia while safeguarding their respective national
interests. Unfortunately, all the "levers" proved
fragile and tentative, although they could meet some of the
realistic considerations of the politicians when they were
in operation. |
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| 可说是"好景"不长，东西方对峙的冷战很快就结束了新兴力量与反帝反殖这一"杠杆"的脆弱的主导作用。新殖民主义的"非亚洲"力量侵入亚洲，与一些亚洲国家结成反共联盟，不仅在地缘政治上分裂了亚洲，更重要的是破坏了最能统合亚洲的一个主"杠杆"。从此，各国政治家苦苦地寻找在维护自身国家利益基础上用以统合亚洲或其中某地区的"杠杆"。遗憾的是，一个个"杠杆"却是脆弱的，暂时的，尽管它们在运作起来时可以让政治家们的现实考虑得到某种程度上的满足。 |
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| There
was a totally new "lever" behind the emergence of
the "larger triangle" pattern during the 1970's.
This new "lever" was the Third-world strategy and
the anti-hegemony campaign. Strictly speaking, they are not
"levers" of the same category, nevertheless they
were used interchangeably partly because they served similar
functions under the historical circumstances of that time. |
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| 70年代"大三角"格局出现的背后，有一个全新的"杠杆"--第三世界战略与反对霸权主义。严格说来，这两者并非同质的"杠杆"。其所以被"等值"地运用，是因为当时形势下两者功能大致吻合。 |
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| After
the Second World War, the trend of democratization in international
relations has been developing with increasing momentum and
power politics has meet growing opposition from newly-independent
nations, especially from the Third-world countries. Anti-hegemony
has always enjoyed great popularity and wide appeal. In particular,
since the 1970's, it has received more and more strong support
from third-world countries. However, the "Third World"
itself cannot serve as the main "lever" with which
to regulate the international relations. Its function as the
main "lever" is apparent only against the background
of anti-hegemony. Within the Third World itself, there are
different economic-political interests and different nation
groups based on those different economic-political interests.
In addition, there are essential relationships between the
Third-World countries and nation groups and their counterparts
outside the Third World. Some of those essential relationships
may develop into a "sub-lever" under the changed
situation, weakening or even damaging the fragile role of
the previous main "lever" and rendering the apparent
main "lever" of the Third World nonexistent. In
such cases, only the lever of anti-hegemony plays its intermittent
role. In this sense, only the anti-hegemony can be regarded
as an enduring main "lever" which should by no means
be superseded forcibly by the "Third World" notion.
The former is substantial while the latter is virtually intangible.
The latter is subordinated to the former and can be used interchangeably
with the former only when it agrees fundamentally with the
former. |
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| 二战后，国际关系民主化的潮流方兴未艾，强权政治越来越遭到新兴独立国家，尤其是第三世界国家的反对。故反对霸权主义一直具有强烈的号召力。特别是70年代以来，它受到第三世界国家越来越普遍的支持。但"第三世界"本身并非可以充作调整国际关系的主"杠杆"，它只是在反对霸权主义的旗帜下才表现出主"杠杆"的功能。在第三世界内部，存在着不同的政治经济利益及以不同政治经济利益为基础的国家集团，存在着第三世界国家、国家集团与第三世界外国家、国家集团的实质性联系。而有些实质性联系可以因形势变化而变为一个个另类"杠杆"，弱化乃至破坏原主"杠杆"的脆弱作用，从而使"第三世界"这一表面上的主"杠杆"不复存在。这时候只有反霸这一"杠杆"还时隐时现地发挥着某种作用。在这个意义上，可以说只有反对霸权主义才可以被看作为长久性的主"杠杆"，而不应生硬地搬用"第三世界"来取而代之，前者是实质性的，后者是虚化的，后者服从于前者，后者只有在与前者一致或基本吻合的情况下才可能共同使用。 |
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| After
the Cold War, peace and development become the main trends
of the epoch. But we believe that peace and development can
hardly serve as the main "lever" in international
relationship. This is because, on one hand, peace and development
are the eternal themes of any time and in any country. No
politician or country dares to publicly oppose peace and development
as political slogans. On the other hand, peace and development
fall into the spiritual category, the category of principle
and this category cannot substitute for specific national
interests. Countries that all advocate or expect peace and
development may have entirely different orientations of realistic
national interests. Therefore, despite the fact that peace
and development constitute the main motifs of our epoch, it
is difficult for them to act as the main "lever"
in international relations. Then, in the new historical period,
especially under the condition of globalization, how can we
properly understand the function of the "lever"
in international relations? |
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| 冷战结束后，和平与发展成为时代主流。但我们认为，和平与发展很难起国际关系中主"杠杆"的作用。因为，其一，和平与发展是永恒的主题，几乎没有哪个国家哪个政治家敢以公开反对和平发展作为政治号召的；其二，和平与发展属于原则与精神的范畴，它代替不了具体的国家利益。同样主张或期待和平发展的国家却可以有不同的现实国家利益指向。因此，尽管可以说和平与发展是时代的主旋律，但它难以发挥国际关系主"杠杆"的作用。那么，在新的历史时期，特别是在全球化的条件下，如何理解国际关系中的"杠杆"作用？ |
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| Globalization
has undoubtedly contributed to the diversification in international
relations. The author of the present thesis believes that
the diversification of international relations surely include
the diversity of areas. But there is another important implication
that people tend to neglect, that is, the diversity of the
"levers" that facilitate changes in international
relations. More specifically, the many "levers"
that produce the changes in the pattern of international relations
belong to political, economic, cultural and military fields.
Their individual functions have the "equalizing"
tendency and the dominant role of the main "lever"
may become weakened. The main "lever" may have to
depend on the interaction with the "auxiliary levers"
and the relative roles of main "lever" and "auxiliary
lever" are in constant change. Another implication of
diversity is that, in each area of present-day international
relations, there is a relatively independent system consisting
of the main "lever" and the auxiliary "lever",
not entirely restricted by the overall tension produced by
the "system of levers" in other areas. Therefore,
the person responsible for designing and directing a nation's
international relations under the purpose of safeguarding
his national interests must endeavor to different kinds of
"levers" that can promote international relations
under the condition o f safeguarding peace and development
and safeguarding national interests, as well as the main "lever"
in different periods and under different situations in order
to systematically and actively promote the development of
international relations in healthy directions. At the same
time, in dealing with the international relations in a particular
field, he should not only have a clear understanding of the
interactive relationship between this particular field and
other fields but also arrive at a firm grasp of the relative
independence of that particular field. Under the situation
of globalization, each country seems to have paid increasing
attention to the relatively independent development of international
relations in a particular field or in several fields.
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| 全球化无疑推动着国际关系的多元化。笔者认为，国际关系多元化固然包括领域的多元化，但还有一层重要含义容易为人们所忽略，这就是推动国际关系变化的"杠杆"的多元化。具体表现在，推动国际关系格局改变的诸多"杠杆"属于政治的、经济的、文化的、军事的等等。各自的作用有"均化"的趋势，其主"杠杆"的作用发生弱化，并依赖于其他"辅助杠杆"的互动，主"杠杆"和"辅助杠杆"的地位在不断变化中，等等。另外，多元化还有一重含义是，当今国际关系的各个领域都存在着推动本领域发展的相对独立的主"杠杆"和"辅助
杠杆"系统，这套"杠杆系统"不完全受制于其他领域的"杠杆系统"的总体合力。因此，作为以维护国家利益为宗旨的一国国际关系的设计者和指导者，应该善于寻找推动国际关系在维护和平与发展、维护国家利益前提下的多种"杠杆"、以及不同时期不同情况下的主"杠杆"，系统地能动地推动国际关系朝健康的方向发展。同时在处理某一领域的国际关系时，既要把握此领域与其他领域的互动关系，也要善于把握本领域发展的相对独立性。在全球化趋势下，各国似乎越来越注重单个领域或某几个领域国际关系的相对独立的发展。 |
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| Part
II How
to actively grasp the dominant "lever" of international
relations and apply it to China's strategy of opening to
the outside world? I would like to propose the following
tentative ideas. As is mention above, globalization has
brought about the diversification of international relations.
Hence, China needs to develop a diversified, comprehensive
strategy of opening up to the outside world and the subsequent
new awareness. Many areas, including economic and commercial
exchanges, investment, scientific, technological, cultural
and academic exchanges, diplomacy, national defense, and
national security, should establish their respective objective
and framework of opening to the outside world. They should
form a mutually coordinated but relatively independent whole. |
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如何能动把握国际关系的主导"杠杆"并应用到中国的对外开放战略上？笔者有以下不成熟的看法：如上所言，全球化带来了国际关系的多元化。因此，需要一个多元化的全方位的对外开放战略及其新认识。包括经贸往来、投资、科技文化学术交流、外交、防卫、安全等在内的各个领域都应有各自的对外开放目标和框架，它们应是相互协调又相对独立的整体。
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| The
objective and the framework of opening up to the outside world
in each specific area should undergo different degrees of
adjustment according to the national interests and the strategic
needs of different areas in different periods. As for the
intensity of the adjustment, there can be minor, low-intensity
adjustments or major, high-intensity adjustments. Minor adjustments
should be frequent while high-intensity adjustments should
be occasional. Regional adjustments should of course be subordinated
to and instrumental to the needs of the overall adjustments.
However, today, the regional status is becoming increasingly
prominent. If the government decision-maker unduly interferes
in the regional adjustment of a particular field under the
pretext of overall needs or generalizes the overall needs,
this would be detrimental to the opening-up in a particular
field, ultimately or fundamentally undermining the overall
interests. The framework of overall opening-up should be determined
from a long-term and strategic perspective and should maintain
relative stability. Under this pre-condition, each field should
be allowed to operate with high efficiency on a relatively
independent and short-term basis. |
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| 各个领域的对外开放目标和框架可因不同时期各自领域的战略需要和国家利益需要而作不同程度的调整。就调整的力度而言，可有低烈度的微调，有高烈度的大调，等等。微调应该是经常性的，高烈度调整应该是偶然性的。局部调整当然要服从并服务于全局的需要。但在今天，局部的地位有凸显的态势。如果过多地以大局需要为由，或将大局的需要"泛化"，过多地干预局部的某一领域的调整，可能无助于某个领域的对外开放，最终或从根本上损害总体的的利益。全局的开放框架应在长远的、战略的角度上确定，并保持相对的稳定。在这种前提下，应该允许各个领域相对独立的、短时期内的，乃至随机的高速运作。 |
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| It
is apparent that, because of the diversity of the areas that
open to the outside world, the targets of the opening-up process
might overlap. Geographically speaking, it is impossible to
require the targets of the opening-process in each area to
be concentrated in a particular region of the world. From
the perspective of international geo-strategy, it is undoubtedly
important to strengthen China's relationship with its peripheral
countries and regions. But from the viewpoint of scientific,
technological and cultural exchanges, the emphasis should
undoubtedly be placed on the developed countries and regions
in the world in order for China to follow closely the trends
of the latest scientific, technological and cultural development.
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| 显而易见，由于对外开放领域的多元化，其开放的对象是重叠的。在地理上看，不可能要求每一个领域的开放对象都集中于世界上某一片区域。从国际地缘战略来看，无疑应该加强与周边国家地区的关系。但从科技文化交流的角度来看，无疑应将目标重点放在世界上的发达国家和地区，追赶最新的科技文化发展潮流。 |
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| As
for the "lever" of facilitating the opening-up campaign,
we should also develop a pluralistic understanding instead
of dismissing any "lever" for the purpose of preserving
a single "lever". It is essential to actively utilize
their interactive role. While it is necessary to require some
"levers" (for instance, the cultural "lever"
which was traditionally considered "trivial") to
be instrumental to the needs of another "lever",
it is also advisable that we adopt a more cautious attitude
rather than acting rashly or simplistically. |
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| 从推动对外开放的"杠杆"来看，也应有多元化的理解，不应简单地舍弃某一"杠杆"而保持一个"唯一"的"杠杆"，应积极地利用它们之间的互动作用。在要求某些"杠杆"（例如传统上被认为"可有可无"的文化杠杆）服务于另一"杠杆"的需要的时候，应该采取更谨慎的态度，不应简单粗暴而行。 |
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| The
general public should also develop a pluralistic awareness
in terms of their notions of opening-up. They should not view
the changes in a particular area simply as the indicator of
the overall changes and willfully regard the part as representing
the whole. |
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| 从国民的开放观念来看，也应有某种多元化的意识，不应将某一领域的变化简单地视为全局性变化的晴雨表，将"个别"与"整体"随意挂钩。 |
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| On
the issue of cultural "lever", which used to be
most seriously neglected by the academics, the idea of "the
conflicts of civilizations" as proposed by Huntingdon
seems to have significantly enhanced the status and the function
of the "lever" of culture (civilization). Although
Huntingdon's idea initially appeared sensational and has been
greatly criticized in the past, a careful reflection would
tell us that what Huntingdon was doing was actually to remind
us that it is the high time that we stop dismissing the role
of "cultural lever" in international relations.
Admittedly, the greatest deficiency in Huntingdon's thought
is its absolutism, with over-emphasis on the negative impact
of culture. Nevertheless, his research indicates that culture
as a "lever" in the future international relations
is becoming increasingly prominent and can become the most
important "lever" apart from the main "lever".
It should not be strange if one day it indeed develops into
the most important "lever". Another function of
the cultural "lever" is that it is the "lever"
most easily to be activated. When other "levers"
fail to work either because of sensitivity or because of "being
heavily burden", the cultural "lever" can easily
undertake the mission of functioning as a "lever".
Or when other "levers" remain in a dormant state
due to a number of factors, the cultural "lever"
may operate independently, preventing the cooling-down of
bilateral and multilateral relations. |
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| 在以往最为人们所轻视的文化"杠杆"问题上，亨廷顿的"文明冲突论"似乎一下子提高了文化（文明）"杠杆"的地位和作用。尽管亨氏的观点乍看之下有点危言耸听，尽管它已受到那么多的驳诘。但冷静思之，亨氏的观点倒真的提醒世人，现在该是结束以往对"文化杠杆"在国际关系中的作用不屑一顾的时候了。诚然，亨氏观点的最大缺憾在于它的绝对性，太强调负作用力。但它毕竟表明，文化作为未来国际关系中"杠杆"的作用正在凸显，它可以成为主"杠杆"之外最重要的"杠杆"。假若有朝一日成为最重要的"杠杆"，人们也不应感到奇怪。文化的"杠杆"作用还在于，它是一个最容易启动的"杠杆"。当其他"杠杆"要么由于敏感，要么由于"负重"而难于启动的时候，文化"杠杆"可以轻而易举地承负起"杠杆"的使命。当其他"杠杆"由于各种因素可能处于休眠状态的时候，文化"杠杆"可以独立地动作，可避免双边、多边国际关系陷于冷却。 |
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| Part
III
The
present-day globalization has been accompanied by regional
integration. The greater the extent of globalization, the
stronger the overall cohesion of the regional interests.
A typical example in this regard is the European Union.
The integration of European Union does not mean that there
is only one voice speaking in all the areas. At least this
would not happen in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless,
the clearest indication of E.U.' s integration is that there
is a main "lever" that dominates the relations
in other areas within the alliance --- a unified currency.
Although differences in other areas are possible, they are
not likely to be infinitely augmented as long as this main
"lever" keeps functioning. Instead, those differences
would remain within the limits of being abridged. It can
also be asserted that those differences are the necessary
conditions that must be surmounted for the higher degree
of integration in the future. Thus, the process of regional
integration is a process of the unification of the regional
interests (different from the usual "economic integration"
which is a form of high-level economic cooperation). The
process of a comprehensive integration of regional interests
is also a process of developing a "pole", an international
"pole". Therefore, a conclusion can be reached
that multi-polarization not only encompass the "main
pole" in the global (international) sense but also
the "sub-poles" in the regional sense. It is beyond
doubt that the "main pole" plays an important
role in the process of integration, however, the formation
of the "main pole" cannot happen without the support
and the contribution of the "sub-poles". In the
current studies of international relations, scholars tend
to focus excessive attention on the "main pole"
while neglecting the "sub-poles" and their relationship
with the "main pole".
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| 三
在当今全球化的同时出现了区域一体化的趋势。全球化程度越高，其区域利益整体的聚合度越强。一个典型的例子是欧盟。欧盟的一体化并非意味着在所有领域以一个声音说话，至少在看得见的将来不会走到这一步。但欧盟一体化的最明显标志是在其内部有一个统合其他领域关系的主"杠杆"--单一货币。尽管在某些领域出现分歧，但在主"杠杆"的作用下，这些分歧不会无限放大，或说处在可以拉合的范围内。也可以说这些分歧是未来更高程度的一体化的必经的磨合阶段。因此，这种区域一体化的过程实际上是区域利益整合化的过程（与一般意义上作为经济合作的高级形式的"经济一体化"意义不同）。一个地区利益的高度整合过程实际上也是一个"极"--一个国际级的"极"形成的过程。故云，多极化，既包括全球性（国际级）的"主极"，也包括地区性的"次极"。"主极"固然会在一体化进程中起主要作用，但"主极"的形成离不开"次极"的辅持与合力。目前在国际关系研究中，人们似乎关注"主极"太多，但对"次极"及其与"主极"关系关注不足。 |
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| As
one of the "main poles" in the future international
relations, China (currently a relatively weak main pole still
in the period of growing-up) has to rely on the support and
the contribution from different "sub-poles" in other
regions. Of course, some of the components in those "sub-poles"
(each individual country as a unit) may combines forces with
the "main poles" and "sub-poles" outside
the region, producing some negative impacts and the centrifugal
force. Consequently, judging from the perspective of seeking
regional "levers" of international relations, China
should endeavor to discover and strengthen those positive
forces conducive to the development of China as a "main
pole". |
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| 中国作为未来国际关系中的一个"主极"（目前还是一个成长中的较弱的"主极";），同样有赖于所处地区各个"次极"的支撑和合力。当然，这些"次极"中的某些组成部分（以国家为单位）会因与本地区外的"主极"、"次极"进行力量组合而形成负作用力和离散力。故从寻找地区国际关系"杠杆"的角度来考虑，应寻找和加强有利于中国"主极"成长的正作用力。 |
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| I
believe that there are some magneto-sucker "sub-poles"
in China's peripheral regions and China as a "main pole"
has penetrated or will penetrate into those developing "sub-poles".
China should alertly guard against and endeavor to dismiss
the negative effect produced by those "exclusive sub-poles."
|
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| 笔者认为，中国周边存在着磁吸型的"次极"；中国"主极"已渗透或可能渗透到一些发展中的"次极"中去；中国应警省并努力摒除某些"排斥型"的"次极"的负作用。 |
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| ASEAN
will undoubtedly develop into a powerful regional "sub-pole"
and the process of economic integration will be the main "lever"
for its internal development. However, the process of economic
integration is slower than expected and may even come into
stagnation. Therefore, the degree of the unification of the
interests within this "sub-pole" is still low. |
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| 东盟无疑将向强有力的地区"次极"的方向发展。这个次极内部发展的主"杠杆"是经济一体化进程。但这个进程明显不如预期的快，有停滞不前的趋势。因此，这个"次极"内部的利益整合度尚低。 |
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| From
the perspective of the diversified opening-up, China should
strengthen its opening-up process on many levels and in different
forms to this "sub-pole" in order to reinforce mutual
relationship. Currently, the level of cooperation in certain
areas (economy trade, investment, and security) is relatively
high while the level of cooperation in other areas (cultural
exchanges, for instance) is comparatively low. |
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| 从多元开放的角度来看，中国应加强与这一"次极"内部的多元、多层次开放，以加强双方关系。目前，一些领域的合作程度较高（如经贸、投资、安全等），一些领域的合作程度尚弱（如文化交流等）。 |
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| Because
of the low level of the integration of interests within the
larger ASEAN so far, the looseness of this organization is
rather obvious. Some nations inside this organization have
developed a higher level of cooperation with the countries
outside the region than with the countries inside this region.
This might quicken the disintegration of this "sub-pole".
Of course, some of the out-of-the-region co-operations are
beneficial and non-detrimental to China. But some may damage
Chinese interests. |
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| 由于已形成的大东盟的利益整合度低，其内部的松散性十分突出，一些国家与区域外国家的合作程度甚至比与区域内国家的合作程度还高。这可能会加剧这个"次极"的离散。当然，这种区外合作有的有利或无损于中国的国家利益，有的则有损于中国的国家利益。 |
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| For
China's cooperation with ASEAN, how to seek and specify the
main areas of cooperation in the near future and to turn the
cooperation into a main "lever" facilitating cooperation
in other areas is still an important question that deserves
serious consideration. Similarly, it is also crucial to determine
the main area of cooperation between China and the individual
countries within ASEAN to promote cooperation in other areas
that are conducive to the cooperation between China and the
ASEAN as a whole. |
| |
| 中国与东盟的合作如何寻找和确定一定时期内的主要合作领域，以之作为主"杠杆"带动其他领域的合作，仍然是今天应予思考的问题。同理，中国与东盟内的单个国家如何选准其合作的主要领域以带动中国与这个国家在各方面的合作，同时也有利于中国与东盟整体的合作，也应予以关注。 |
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| Incidentally,
how important are the "Asian values" among numerous
"levers"? I believe that their role as a "lever"
is rather slight, absolutely impossible to serve as the main
"lever". This is because, first of all, the so-called
"Asian values" are based, according to many accounts,
on three pillars: familial and social stability, authoritarianism,
and anti-hegemony. Familial and social stability is the precondition
for the economic development and social progress in a particular
country or a particular region. Although not without its positive
effects, it is often realized by means of authoritarianism
in many countries. Many believe that authoritarianism is inevitable
and necessary at certain stages of economic development. However,
it should also be noted that authoritarianism does not necessarily
produce a positive effect on the process of political democratization.
Even when it serves as some kind of "necessary cost",
to some degree it will play the role of a double-edged sword.
Anti-hegemony enjoys a greater degree of consensus that those
two but it is strictly confined to the field of international
relations. It should also be pointed out that anti-hegemony
is somehow shaken because of the involvement of the sovereignty
issue under the current situation of international relations.
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| 这里顺便一提，在众多的"杠杆"中，"亚洲价值观"的作用有多大？笔者认为其作为"杠杆"的价值不大，更谈不上作为主"杠杆"。因为，其一，根据众多的论述，所谓"亚洲价值观"，是在三根柱子的基础上支撑起来的。这就是：家庭与社会的稳定、权威主义、反霸权主义。家庭与社会稳定是一国一地区经济发展与社会进步的前提，具有正面意义，但它在许多国家中是以权威主义作为手段来实现的。很多人认为，权威主义在经济发展的一定阶段是必然的和必要的。但同时也应看到，它对政治民主化进程不会必然产生正动力。甚至在"必要代价"的同时，它也有某种程度上的双刃剑效应。反对霸权主义比这两者具有更高的共识度，但它局限于国际关系领域。同时还应看到，反对霸权主义这一鲜明的大旗在目前国际形势下由于主权问题的渗入而受到动摇。 |
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| The
opposition against hegemony used to be a vital issue primarily
because of the campaign to fight against the interference
in the internal affairs of other countries. However, with
the development of globalization, the role of international
organizations and international mechanisms are increasing.
Under such circumstance, it is necessary to elucidate and
re-define the traditional notion of "interference in
the internal affairs of other countries". Of course,
we are strongly opposed to the practice of some Western countries
of wantonly altering the solemn meaning of sovereignty under
the pretext of globalization and grossly intervening in the
internal affairs of other countries. But this does not imply
that it is unnecessary to re-examine some of the traditional
concepts. Only in this way can we hold higher the great banner
of anti-hegemony and promote the democratizing process of
international politics. Secondly, if we count by the number
of individual countries that would vote for the "Asian
values", we will find that not many countries would readily
identify with those values, and even fewer countries would
have a definite conception and attitude toward them. Other
countries would either oppose or remain equivocal toward those
values. The last, but not the least important, point is that
the concept of "Asian values" is loose in its internal
theoretical structure. Strictly speaking, it is not a concept
tight in its connotation and specific in its denotation. The
three pillars as mentioned above are isolated and detached
among one another. |
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| 反对霸权主义过去主要是因为反对干涉别国内政而表现出强大生命力的。但随着全球化的推进，国际组织和国际机制的作用在增强，以往"干涉内政"的一些传统含义确实面临着重新澄清和界定的必要。我们当然反对某些西方国家借全球化之机肆意篡改主权的庄严含义，粗暴干涉他国内政。但这并不意味对某些传统的内容没有重新审示的必要。只有这样，才能更有效地高举反对霸权主义的大旗，促进国际政治的民主化进程。其二，就以国家为单位的"赞成票"来说，"亚洲价值观"的共识度很低，只有少数亚洲国家对之有明确的诠释和态度，其他国家要么反对，要么抱含糊的态度。最后，并非最不重要的一点，"亚洲价值观"的内部理论结构松散，严格来说并非一个内涵紧凑、外延清晰的概念。上述这三根柱子是相互脱离、互不粘联的。
|
| |
| Hence,
while propagating the positive aspects of the "Asian
values", we should also be aware that it is immature
to regard the Asian values as a "lever" for framing
the development of the relationship between China and the
ASEAN countries. |
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| 因之，在弘扬"亚洲价值观"中有积极意义的内容的同时，也不能不看到，若以"亚洲价值观"作为构建中国东盟国家关系发展的一根"杠杆"是不成熟的。 |
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| The
Shanghai Cooperation Mechanism is an instructive example of
the penetration of China (as the main pole) into the regional
"sub-poles". In this kind of cooperation between
the main and subsidiary poles (leaving aside the cooperation
between China and Russia as two main poles), the main "lever"
that drives the development of cooperation has been found
--- the fight against terrorism, religious extremism, and
cross-border crimes (those three factors are tightly connected
in their connotation). In this aspect, it is superior to China's
cooperation with the ASEAN. |
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| 上海合作机制是中国（"主极"）渗入地区"次极"合作的例子。在这种"主次极"合作（另外也有中国与俄罗斯两个"主极"，当别论）中，找到了驱动合作进展的主"杠杆"--反对恐怖主义、宗教极端主义、跨国犯罪（这几者的内涵十分紧凑，内联性很高）。这是优于中国东盟合作之处。 |
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| The
Shanghai Cooperation Mechanism faces three possibilities.
The first is whether the member countries of this mechanism
can expand the scope of cooperation of this international
organization supported by this main "lever", and
whether this "lever" can become an enduring element
for unifying the regional interests and serve as the true
driving force for the further development of the Shanghai
Cooperation Mechanism. The second is whether those countries
can derive new "sub-levers" outside this main "lever"
to function interactively along with the main "lever"
and possibly to grow into a new "main lever". The
third is whether the existing differences in other areas among
the members of this mechanism will produce negative impacts
and how serious those impacts might be, and what are the measures
for eliminating and preventing it from growing into a negative
"lever". |
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| 上海合作机制中，面临着三个机遇。一是能否在这一主"杠杆"的牵动下，扩大这个国际组织的合作范围，这一主"杠杆"能否成为这一地区利益整合的持久因素，成为让上海合作机制进一步升级的真正动力；二是能否在主"杠杆"外衍生出新的"辅助杠杆"，与主"杠杆"一道发挥互动的作用，或者成为新的主"杠杆"；三是这个机制成员间现存的源于其他因素的分歧会否或在多大程度上形成负作用力，如何消弥并遏止其上升为一种携负作用力的"杠杆"。 |
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| In
Northeast Asia, the situation seems extremely complicated.
Between the two "main poles" of China and Japan
which are relatively weak at present, the function of the
"main lever" which used to facilitate the rapid
development of their relations seems to be declining and this
"main lever" is further affected by some negative
factors. The bilateral relationship between those two weak
"main levers" is being seriously affected by the
impact produced by the United States, a powerful "main
lever" from the outside. As two equally weak "main
poles", China and Russia are also exerting their influence
in this region, but their current cooperation is not focused
on the Northeast Asia. Moreover, the regional cooperation
between China and Russia in Northeast Asia lack the powerful
support from any "lever", even incurring negative
disturbances sometimes. It can be safely asserted that the
friendly atmosphere between China and Russia in Northeast
Asia results from their mutual national interests. The two
countries on the Korean Peninsular, located between those
three weak "main poles", can only individually develop
their relations with one of those three weak "main poles".
It is obvious that, in Northeast Asia, the lever only functions
for bilateral relations. Whether those countries can discover
a main "lever" that can activate multilateral cooperation
in the region may have to depend on the passage of time and
on the wisdom of the politicians in those countries. |
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| 在东北亚，矛盾显得错综复杂。在中日两个目前的弱"主极"之间，原来牵动两者关系迅速发展的主"杠杆"的作用在弱化，并受到一些负作用力的干扰，这两个弱"主极"的双边关系受到外部一个大"主极"（美国）作用力的肆意干扰，中俄两个目前同样是弱"主极"的国家也在这一地区发生影响，但中俄目前合作的聚焦点不在东北亚，
且中俄在东北亚的众多属地方合作的领域缺乏强有力的"杠杆"牵动，甚至不时受到负作用力的干扰。可以说，中俄在东北亚的友好气氛多半源于两国国家利益。夹于这几个弱"主极"之间的朝鲜半岛两国，也只能单一地与三个弱"主极"中的某一个发展关系。可见，在东北亚，"杠杆"作用多停留在双边之间，能否找到牵动多边合作的主"杠杆"，可能有待于时间的推移和各方政治家的智慧。 |
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| In
South Asia, India is trying its best to become one of the
potential "main level". At present, it has attained
the status as a quasi "main pole". In South Asia,
there is no "main lever" that can promote the development
of the regional relations. Instead, there are only negative
"levers" at work in this region. Consequently, for
China as a main pole and South Asia as a sub-region, there
is no cooperative mechanism at present. What China can do
is to discover a "lever" with individual countries
in this region with which to conduct bilateral cooperation.
It is expected that efforts in this area will prove fruitful. |
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| 在南亚，印度在极力挤进未来"主极"的行列，目前已处于一个准"主极"的位置上。但在南亚，缺乏驱动整个地区关系发展的主"杠杆"，相反，起负作用力的"杠杆"倒是存在。故目前中国对南亚不可能有"主极"对整个地区一级的合作机制，只能在"主极"与这一地区的单个国家的双边之间寻找"杠杆"。相信这种努力会获得成功。 |
